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Abstract
We prove that finding an ǫ-Nash equilibrium in a succinctly repre-
sentable game with many players is PPAD-hard for constant ǫ. Our proof
uses succinct games, i.e. games whose (exponentially-large) payoff func-
tion is represented by a smaller circuit. Our techniques build on a recent
query complexity lower bound by Babichenko [1].
1 Introduction
Nash equilibrium is the central concept in Game Theory. Much of its importance
and attractiveness comes from its universality: by Nash’s Theorem [14], every
finite game has at least one. The result that finding a Nash equilibrium is
PPAD-complete, and therefore intractable [4, 2] casts this universality in doubt,
since it suggests that there are games whose Nash equilibria, though existent,
are in any practical sense inaccessible.
Can approximation repair this problem? Chen et al. [2] proved that it is also
hard to find an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for any ǫ that is polynomially small - even for
two-player games. The only remaining hope is a PTAS, i.e. an approximation
scheme constant ǫ > 0. Whether there is a PTAS for the Nash equilibrium prob-
lem is the most important remaining open question in equilibrium computation.
When we say “ǫ-Nash equilibrium,” we mean the additive sort; for multiplicative
ǫ-Nash equilibria, Daskalakis [3] shows that the problem is PPAD-hard even for
two-player games; notice that such a result is unlikely for additive approximation
and a constant number of players, since a quasi-polynomial time approximation
algorithm exists [13].
Our results
In this paper we make a modest step towards the inapproximability, in the
standard additive sense, of Nash equilibrium:
∗UC Berkeley. I am grateful to Christos Papadimitriou for inspiring discussions, comments,
and advice. I would also like to thank Constantinos Daskalakis and Paul Goldberg for pointing
out important missing references in an earlier version.
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Theorem 1. There exist constants ǫ, k > 0, such that given a game with m
players and k actions, and a poly-size circuit that computes the vector of pay-
offs for each vector of pure strategies, it is PPAD-hard to compute an ǫ-Nash
equilibrium.
Even though it is the first result establishing inapproximability of an ad-
ditive notion of Nash equilibrium, it has two deficiencies: (a) it is about ǫ-
Nash-equilibrium (sometimes1 also called ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium) [4],
requiring that all actions in the support be approximately best responses (in-
stead of the mixture being best response in ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium);
and (b) it holds for a somewhat awkward class of multiplayer games we call
succinct games2, in which the utility of each player for an action profile is cal-
culated by a circuit. For example, on such games computing the exact best
response is PP-hard.
En route to proving Theorem 1, we also prove a similar statement about the
computational complexity of finding an approximate fixed-point for a continuous
(in fact, Lipschitz) function, which may be of separate interest.
Theorem 2. There exist constants ǫ,M > 0, such that given a M -Lipschitz,
poly-time computable function f : [0, 1]
n → [0, 1]n, it is PPAD-hard to find an
ǫ-approximate fixed point of f .
Pure equilibria and PPAD-hardness It is interesting to note that all our
hard game instances have pure equilibria. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first setting where PPAD-hardness is proved for games which have pure
equilibria. Naturally, in any game with a poly-size payoff matrix, it is easy to
find any pure equilibrium.
1.1 Related works
Schoenebeck and Vadhan [20] studied comprehensively the computational com-
plexity of Nash Equilibria in succinct games and other concise representations.
They characterized the computational complexity, for different levels of approx-
imation, of the following questions: is a given strategy profile a Nash equili-
bium? does there exist a pure equilibrium? does there exist a Nash equilibrium
in which the payoff to a given player meets a given guarantee? They also prove
that the problem of finding an ǫ-Nash equilibrium (for constant ǫ) in circuit
games where each player has two strategies is BPP-hard (for a promise-problem
version of BPP), and belongs to PMA. Finding a tighter complexity classification
is stated as an open question.
We note that different variants of succinct games were also studied by [18,
7, 8].
1See [3] for a short discussion on terminology.
2There is some disagreement in the literature about the terminology: a very similar defini-
tion appeared in [20] as circuit games; [7] discuss polynomially definable games; while [8] did
use the term succinct games.
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Related works on query complexity
There are several interesting results on the query complexity of approximate
Nash equilibria, where the algorithm is assumed to have black-box access to
the exponential-size payoff function. In other words, in this setting the payoff
function is allowed to be arbitrarily complex.
A recent paper by Hart and Nisan [11] proves that any deterministic algo-
rithm needs to query at least an exponential number of queries to compute any
ǫ-Nash equilibrium - and even for any ǫ-correlated equilibrium. For ǫ-correlated
equilibrium, on the other hand, Hart and Nisan show a randomized algorithm
that uses a number of queries polynomial in n and ǫ−1.
Of particular interest to us, is a very recent paper by Babichenko [1], that
extends the hardness result of Hart and Nisan to show that any randomized
algorithm still requires an exponential number of queries to find an ǫ-Nash
equilibrium. Our proof is inspired by Babichenko’s work and builds on his
techniques.
Finally, yet a newer paper by Goldberg and Roth [10] characterizes the query
complexity of approximate coarse correlated equilibrium in games with many
players. More important for our purpose is their polynomial upper bound on
the query complexity of ǫ-Nash equilibria for any family of games that have any
concise representation. This result is to be contrasted with (a) Babichenko’s
query complexity lower bound, which uses a larger family of games, and (b)
our result which applies exactly to this setting and gives a lower bound on the
computational complexity.
A much older yet very interesting and closely related result is that of Hirsch,
Papadimitriou, and Vavasis [12]. Hirsch et al. show that any deterministic
algorithm for computing a Brouwer fixed point in the oracle model must make
an exponential -in the dimension n and the approximation ǫ- number of queries
for values of the function. The techniques in [12] have proven particularly useful
both in Babichenko’s work, and in ours.
Related works on succinct representations of other objects
Although our notion of succinct representation is somewhat non-standard in
game theory, similar succinct problems have been considered before. Galperin
and Wigderson [9] and Papadimitriou and Yannakakis [17] studied the compu-
tation of graph properties for exponential-size graphs given access to a circuit
that locally computes the adjacency matrix.
Much more recently, Dobzinski and Vondrak studied optimization of succinctly-
represented objects for submodular optimization [6] and for combinatorial auc-
tions [5]. As in our case, in both of those settings similar hardness results were
previously known in the value oracle model.
1.2 Techniques
Our techniques in this paper are significantly different from previous works on
PPAD-hardness in games such as Daskalakis et al. [4] and Chen et al. [2]. In
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particular two ingredients of our reduction are fundamentally different from the
so-called “DGP framework”: the construction of the Brouwer function, and the
reduction from Brouwer to Nash. We note that in both cases our techniques are
much closer to the recent work of Babichenko [1].
From Brouwer to Nash Our reduction from Brouwer to Nash follows an
argument presented in Eran Shmaya’s blog [21]. Each player has actions in
[0, 1], and the players are divided into two groups: the first group tries to imitate
the second group, while the second group tries to imitate the Brouwer function
applied to the actions chosen by the first group.
In [4, 2], per contra, the probability assigned to each action corresponds,
roughly, to a variable in [0, 1]. While this construction is more stringent on
the number of actions, it requires a relatively complex averaging gadget. More
importantly, this averaging gadget as implemented by Chen et al. seems to
require a polynomial blow-up of the error. Thus, it is not clear how to achieve
a constant hardness of approximation in this way.
The Brouwer function In order to construct the hard Brouwer function we
use a construction due to Hirsch, Papadimitriou, and Vavasis [12] that embeds
paths as mappings over [0, 1]
n
, in a delicate way which we describe later.
Chen et al. [2], on the other hand, divide the unit hypercube into subcubes
of constant edge-length, and specify a color for each subcube. The i-th color cor-
responds to ξi, i.e. the i-th unit vector, whereas a special red color corresponds
to −∑ ξi. Any vector of players’ mixed strategies corresponds to a distribution
over neighboring subcubes, and we get a fixed point whenever the expectation
of the corresponding vectors is 0n.
Clearly, any distribution corresponding to an exact fixed point must have
support over a panchromatic neighborhood, i.e. a neighborhood with subcubes
corresponding to all n + 1 colors. Finally, it is shown that it is PPAD-hard to
find such panchromatic neighborhood. In fact, a panchromatic neighborhood
is still necessary for any Θ(1/n)-approximate3 fixed point. However, a (1/n)-
approximate fixed point can be achieved from a distribution over only n colors:
for example, taking each of the colors i ∈ [n] with probability 1/n results in the
expected vector (1/n, . . . , 1/n).
2 Preliminaries
Throughout this paper we use the max-norm as the default measure of distance.
In particular, when we say that f is M -Lipschitz we mean that for every x and
y in the domain of f , ‖f (x)− f (y)‖
∞
≤M ‖x− y‖
∞
.
3Approximation here is in the sense of L∞. In fact, it seems to give a constant hardness
of approximation in L1, but unfortunately it is not clear how to use that for a reduction to
Nash equilibria.
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The EndOfTheLine problem
Our reduction starts form the EndOfTheLine problem. This problem was
implicit in [16], and explicitly by defined Daskalakis et al. [4].
Definition 1. EndOfTheLine: ([4]) Given two circuits S and P , with n input
bits each, such that P (0n) = 0n 6= S (0n), find an input x ∈ {0, 1}n such that
P (S (x)) 6= x or S (P (x)) 6= x 6= 0n.
Theorem. (Essentially [16]) EndOfTheLine is PPAD-complete (for poly-size
S and P ).
Succinct normal form games
We consider games with n players. Player i chooses one of k actions ai ∈ Ai.
The utility of player i for each vector of actions is given by ui : ×j Aj → [0, 1].
Explicitly describing the ui’s requires space exponential in n. In this paper
we restrict our attention to games that can be described succinctly; namely,
there is a poly-size circuit that computes each of the ui’s given a vector of
actions a ∈ ×jAj .
ǫ-Nash equilibrium vs ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium
A mixed strategy of player i is a distribution xi ∈ ∆Ai. We say that a vector
of mixed strategies x ∈ ×j∆Aj is a Nash equilibrium if every strategy ai in the
support of xi is a best response to the actions of the mixed strategies of the rest
of the players, x−i. Formally,
Ea−i∼x−i [ui (ai, a−i)] = max
a′∈Ai
Ea−i∼x−i [ui (a
′, a−i)] .
Equivalently, x is a Nash equilibrium if each mixed strategy xi is a best mixed
response to x−i:
Ea∼x [ui (a)] = max
x′
i
∈∆Ai
Ea∼x′ [ui (a)] .
Each of those equivalent definitions can be generalized to include approxima-
tion in a different way. (Of course, there are also other interesting generalizations
of Nash equilibria to approximate settings.) We say that x is an ǫ-approximate
Nash equilibrium (ǫ-ANE) if each xi is an ǫ-best mixed response to x−i:
Ea∼x [ui (a)] ≥ max
x′
i
∈∆Ai
Ea∼x′ [ui (a)]− ǫ .
On the other hand, we generalize the first definition of Nash equilibrium by
saying that x is a ǫ-Nash equilibrium (ǫ-NE; sometimes also ǫ-well-supported
Nash equilibrium) if each ai in the support of xi is an ǫ-best response to x−i:
Ea−i∼x−i [ui (ai, a−i)] ≥ max
a′∈Ai
Ea−i∼x−i [ui (a
′, a−i)]− ǫ .
It is easy to see every ǫ-NE is also an ǫ-ANE, but the converse is false.
Given an ǫ-ANE it is possible to find a Θ(
√
ǫn)-NE (see e.g. [4]); however
computational hardness of n−c-approximate Nash equilibrium is a corollary of
[2].
3 Main result
Definition 2. Given a game over m players with k actions, and a poly-size
circuit that computes the vector of payoffs for each vector of pure strategies,
SuccinctNash(n, k, ǫ) is the problem of computing an ǫ-NE for this game.
Theorem 1. SuccinctNash
(
n, 104, 10−8
)
is PPAD-hard.
Proof overview
We begin our proof with the EndOfTheLine problem on {0, 1}n [4]. In the first
step, we embed the EndOfTheLine as a collection H of vertex-disjoint paths
on the (2n+ 1)-dimensional hypercube graph. Given H , our second step is to
construct a continuous mapping f : [0, 1]
2n+2 → [0, 1]2n+2 whose fixed points
correspond to ends of paths inH . This step is done using a technique introduced
by Hirsch et al. [12]. Our third and final step is to reduce the problem of finding
approximate fixed points of f to the problem of finding approximate NE in a
4n+ 4-players game via a reduction which appeared in Shmaya’s blog [21].
3.1 Embedding the EndOfTheLine graph as paths in {0, 1}2n+1
Our first step in the reduction is to embed an EndOfTheLine graph as vertex-
disjoint paths on the (2n+ 1)-dimensional hypercube graph. We first recall that
the input to the EndOfTheLine problem is given as two circuits S and P ,
which define a directed graph over G over {0, 1}n. Given S and P , we construct
a collection H of vertex-disjoint paths over the (2n+ 1)-dimensional hypercube
graph, such that each starting or end point of a path in H corresponds to a
unique starting or end point of a line in G.
In order to construct our embedding we divide the 2n + 1 coordinates as
follows: the first n coordinates store current vertex u, the next n coordinates for
next vertex in the line, v, and finally, the last coordinate b stores a compute-next
vs copy bit. When b = 0, the path proceeds to update v ← S (u), bit-by-bit.
When this update is complete, the value of b is changed to 1. Whenever b = 1,
the path proceeds by copying u← v bit-by-bit, and then changes that value of
b again. Finally, when u = v = S (u) and b = 0, the path reaches an end point.
Notice that the paths in H do not intersect. Furthermore, given a vector in
p ∈ {0, 1}2n+1, we can output in polynomial time whether p belongs to a path
in H , and if so which are the previous and consecutive vectors in the path. It
is therefore PPAD-hard to find a starting or end point of any path in H other
than 0n.
3.2 Continuous mapping on [0, 1]2n+2
Our second step, which constructs a continuous mapping given H , is probably
the most technically involved. Fortunately, almost all of the technical work we
need was already done by Hirsch et al. [12].
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Definition 3. Given anM -Lipschitz, poly-time computable function f : [0, 1]
n →
[0, 1]
n
, SuccinctBrouwer(n,M, ǫ) is the problem of computing an ǫ-approximate
fixed point of f .
Theorem 2. SuccinctBrouwer(n, 80, 1/88) is PPAD-hard.
Proof. We begin with a quick overview of the mapping constructed by Hirsch et
al. [12]. We will then show how to adapt their construction to fit our reduction.
In the following, we denote g (x) = f (x)− x.
The HPV mapping
Given a path in {0, 1}2n+1, Hirsch et al. [12] construct a mapping f : [0, 1]2n+2 →
[0, 1]
2n+2
that satisfies4:
1. g is 79-Lipschitz (thus, f is 80-Lipschitz)
2. ‖g (x)‖
∞
≥ 1/88 for every x that does not correspond to the endpoint of
the path
3. The value of g at each point x depends only on whether the path passes
through the subcube corresponding to x, and in which direction.
However, for our purposes, it does not suffice to embed just a single path.
In particular, we have one path whose starting point we know (and must not
correspond to a fixed point), and many other paths (and cycles), whose end
points -and starting points- correspond to additional fixed points.
Luckily, the same construction of [12] continues to work in our case, with
only minor changes. In order to explain those modifications, we first briefly
recall some of the details in the original construction.
We divide the [0, 1]
2n+2
hypercube into smaller subcubes of edge-size h.
In [12], a single path over {0, 1}2n+1 corresponds to a (2n+ 1)-dimensional
sequence of subcubes, called the tube, that all lie in a special designated slice of
[0, 1]
2n+2
.
The home subcube, the subcube that corresponds to the beginning of the
path, is special: the flow from all subcubes that do not belong to the path leads
to this subcube.
For the purpose of adapting this construction, the most important property
is that on (and near) the outer facets of the tube, i.e. the facets that do not face
other subcubes in the path, g (x) = δξ2n+2, where ξ2n+2 is the (2n+ 2)-unit
vector, and δ is some small parameter (constant in this paper). The same also
holds for all points in the slice that do not belong to the tube. Intuitively, this
means that all subcubes -whether they belong to the tube or not- look the same
from the outside (except for the two facets that continue the path).
4See also [1] for the choice of constants. Please note the change in variable names: h,M, 2−p
in [12] correspond to δ, λ, ǫ, respectively, in [1].
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Embedding multiple paths
Given a collection H of non-intersecting paths in {0, 1}2n+1, we construct a
mapping f : [0, 1]
2n+2 → [0, 1]2n+2 in a similar fashion. Essentially, we construct
many tubes (some of which may form close cycles) in the same slice.
If any path in H passes through some p ∈ {0, 1}2n+1, then p corresponds
to a subcube on which f is defined exactly the same as in [12]. Likewise, every
end point of path in H corresponds to a subcube on which f is defined exactly
the same as the unique end point in [12].
Our construction differs in the starting points of the paths in H . In [12], the
starting point corresponds to the home subcube, which is universally unique:
the flow from any subcube outside the path leads towards that point. Indeed we
cannot imitate this behaviour for the starting point of every path inH . However,
this does not complicate our reduction, because all other starting points are also
(PPAD-) hard to find. In particular we can construct f in a similar fashion to
the end points of the paths, thereby creating additional fixed points.
For each starting point, consider the corresponding subcube of [0, 1]2n+2.
The values of f on the facet F1 in the direction of the path, are already deter-
mined by the next subcube in the path. Now, we let g (x) = δξ2n+2 uniformly
for every point x on the opposite facet, F0. For any x
′ between the facets we
interpolate by taking the weighted average of the values f
(
x
′
0
)
and f
(
x
′
1
)
on the projections of x′ on F0 and F1, respectively. (This corresponds to [12]’s
“Cartesian interpolation”). Notice that this subcube also satisfies g (x) = δξ2n+2
for all points on facets that do not face the rest of the path.
Outside the subcubes corresponding to the additional paths, all the prop-
erties of the mapping are trivially preserved. On the interface between any
subcube in an additional path, and any other subcube which is not consecutive
in the same path, all the properties are again preserved since adding the paths
does not change the value of f near those facets. Finally within each path, f is
constructed exactly the same way as the single path in [12], and therefore it is
easy to see that all the properties continue to hold - except of course the new
fixed points at the starting points of the additional paths.
Finally, we conclude that it is PPAD-hard to find an approximate fixed point
of f .
3.3 From Brouwer to WSNE
Our third and final step in the proof reduces the problem of finding approximate
fixed points in f to that of finding approximate well-supported Nash equilibria.
The reduction we use is based on [21] and appears almost exactly in this format
in [1].
Proposition 1. (Essentially [1]) SuccinctBrouwer(n,M, ǫ) ≤P SuccinctNash
(
2n, k + 1, 3
4k2
)
,
where k = ⌈ 3+M
ǫ
⌉
Proof. We construct a game with two groups of 2n + 2 players each. The
action set of each player corresponds to {0, 1/k, . . . , 1}. We denote the choice of
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strategies for the first group a = (a1 . . . a2n+2), and b = (b1, . . . b2n+2) for the
second group.
Each player in the first group attempts to imitate the behaviour of the
corresponding player in the second group. Her utility is given by
ui (ai, bi) = − |ai − bi|2
The second group players attempt to imitate the value of f , when applied to
the vector of actions taken by all the players in the first group. The utility of
the i-th player is
vi (bi, a) = − |fi (a)− bi|2
Observe that when the i-th player on the second group (henceforth, player
(i, 2)) applies a mixed strategy, the expected utility for player (i, 1) (the i-th
player in the first group) is given by:
E [ui (ai, bi)] = − |ai − E (bi)|2 −Var (bi)
Let αi ∈ {0, 1/k, . . . , 1} be such that E (bi) ∈ [αi, αi + 1/k], and assume wlog
that E (bi) ∈ [αi, αi + 1/2k]. Then we can lower-bound the expected utility of
player (i, 1) when playing αi:
E [ui (αi, bi)] ≥ − 1
4k2
−Var (bi)
On the other hand, for any γ /∈ {αi, αi + 1/k},
E [ui (γ, bi)] ≤ − 1
k2
−Var (bi)
Therefore in every 3
4k2
-NE, the support of the mixed strategy of player (i, 1)
is restricted to {αi, αi + 1/k}.
For the second group of players, we have
E [vi (bi, a)] = − |E (fi (a))− bi|2 −Var (fi (a))
Let βi ∈ {0, 1/k, . . . , 1} be such that E (fi (a)) ∈ [βi, βi + 1/k], then in every
3
4k2
-NE, the support player (i, 2) is restricted to {βi, βi + 1/k}.
Finally, given a 3
4k2
-NE, we use the Lipschitz property of f to derive an
approximate fixed point. Notice that for α and β as defined above,
|αi − βi| ≤ |αi − E (bi)|+ |E (bi)− βi| ≤ 2
k
Likewise,
|βi − fi (α)| ≤ |βi − E (fi (a))|+ |E (fi (a))− fi (α)| ≤ 1
k
+
M
k
,
where M is the Lipschitz constant of f .
Therefore |α− f (α)|
∞
≤ 3+M
k
, so α is a 3+M
k
-approximate fixed point of
f .
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4 Open problems
We prove that finding an ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium PPAD-hard even
for constant ǫ. This is a modest step towards a better understanding of the
computational complexity of approximating Nash equilibrium in games with a
large number of players. Many important questions remain open:
NE vs WSNE As mentioned earlier, in the domain of constant approxima-
tions, Nash equilibria may be strictly easier than finding well-supported Nash
equilibria.
What is the complexity of finding ǫ-ANE?
We note that a similar obstacle was encountered by Babichenko [1], in the
case of query complexity, for essentially the same reasons.
Simpler games Other, more restrictive forms of succinct games have been
studied quite extensively before (see e.g. [15]). It would be interesting to im-
prove our understanding of the complexity of those games. In particular,
What is the complexity of finding an ǫ-NE in bounded-degree graphical games?
Upper bound on complexity Embarrassingly, we do not have a (non-
trivial) upper bound on the complexity of finding an ǫ-NE. One particular ob-
stacle to showing that this problem belongs to the class PPAD, is that it is not
even clear how to find an approximate best response to mixed strategies without
using randomness. (In particular, by [20], this problem is also BPP-hard; we do
not know whether BPP is contained in PPAD.)
What is the right complexity classification of the problem of finding an ǫ-NE?
5 Addendum
Since the first version of this paper was posted, we found solutions to the first
two open problems mentioned above [19].
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